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Stephen M. Best, The Fugitive's Properties: Law and the Poetics ofPossession,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp. xii + 362. $69 cloth (ISBN
0 -226-04433-5); paper $25.00 (ISBN 0-226-04434-3).
Stephen Best's The Fugitive's Properties is a New Historicist exploration of the
problem of representing personhood in turn-of-the-century American law, litera
ture, and culture. Other works in this vein include Brooke Thomas's American
literary Realism and the Failed Promise of Contract, and Walter Benn Michaels' s
The Gold Standard and the logic ofNaturalism. Like these earlier works, The
Fugitive's Properties presents legal formalism as a self-defeating response to the
social dislocations of commercial and industrial development. Readers of critical
legal histories of this period will find some of Best's conclusions familiar: "The
law's purpose is to produce reliable principles of value that seem to emanate from
the object- with the consequence that the very conception of property as an object
appears only at the end, not the beginning, of any legal deliberation. Equality is no
different ... it too is an effect, not a grounds, of deliberation ..." (274). What Best
adds to the realist critique of formalism, however, is a reading of disputes about
slavery and racial status in the later nineteenth century as reflections of a pervasive
anxiety about commodification ofpersonality: "Slavery is not simply an antebellum
institution that the United States has surpassed but a particular historical form of
an ongoing crisis involving the subjection of personhood to property" (270).
Best begins his argument by juxtaposing the Dred Scott case with the emergence
of intellectual and other intangible property. For Best, disputes over the rendition
of fugitive slaves highlight the dependence of all property on law, and of its value
on such "fugitive" factors as capital, credit, and commercial good will. In Best's
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rhetoric, property in slaves becomes a metaphor for rights of all kinds, as the idea
of estates in persons grounds liberal rights of self-ownership, as well as rights to
privacy and intellectual property. Best is fascinated by the constitution’s euphemistic characterization of fugitive slaves as absconding debtors. He takes this as
a paradigmatic illustration of the capacity of liberal jurisprudence to justify any
social arrangement whatever by constructing a mythology of prior consent.
In the same eclectic chapter, Best recounts the career of “Blind Tom,” a celebrated slave savant who, from childhood could play any piece of music by ear
by hearing it once, and who remained a dependent of his former master for decades after slavery’s end. Best suggests that racist culture managed the anomaly of
African-American genius by identifying authenticity and originality in formalist
terms, as inhering only in creations reducible to some system of notation; and by
associating African-American cultural expression with repetition, rhythm, and
parody as opposed to genuine innovation and progress.
Best’s second chapter juxtaposes Uncle Tom’s Cabin with the emergence of
marginalism in economics. Best reads Stowe’s commercially successful novel as
an ambivalent commentary on the morality of the market in which it was sold,
adapted, translated, and purloined. While Stowe condemns slavery as the sin of
commodifying the soul, she also condemns it as imprudent commerce. Thus slavery corrupts its benefciaries by insulating them from the puritanical discipline of
market and family, and shifting the costs of their imprudence onto their disposable
dependents. Like many abolitionist texts, Uncle Tom’s Cabin presented slaveholders as infected with vices (lazy, shortsighted, and irresponsible) stereotypically
attributed to slaves. Stowe’s villains are at once excessively passionate and insuffciently compassionate. Best sees a similar ambivalence about sentiment and social
mobility in nineteenth-century economic debates about whether price movements
refected real value or fckle fads and idle speculation. Finally, he sees the same
ambivalence and anxiety about consumerism in white appropriation of AfricanAmerican cultural forms that parody the masters’ pretensions.
Best’s wonderfully suggestive third chapter juxtaposes Plessy v. Ferguson with
an early silent flm in which a gentleman firts with a young lady on a train, only
to fnd, on emerging from the darkness of a tunnel, that he is embracing her bemused black maid. Best frst explores the use of railroads as literary and cinematic
symbols of destructive progress, social mobility, and narrative necessity. Next, he
locates the flm as part of a genre of place-switching jokes in cinema and fction
that invoke the fxity of racial status ironically, to dramatize the arbitrariness and
fragility of social position in a rapidly industrializing society. Best fnds the same
trope of place switching repeated in the oral argument and opinion in Plessy. This
leads him, fnally, to an intriguing meditation on counterfactual reasoning in legal
accounts of equality, causation, and damages. In Best’s view, liberal jurisprudence
typically conceives equality in formal terms as fungibility, likening persons to
exchangeable commodities.
This is a stimulating book, loaded with ideas and surprising connections. It is
not, however, without faws. Legal historians will be frustrated to fnd gratuitous
errors, like confusing Charles Sumner and William Graham Sumner, or misattribut-
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ing the term "originalism" to nineteenth-century constitutional lawyers. That such
errors rarely undermine the author's claims points to another problem: at times,
too much disjointed historical detail competes for the reader's attention, with too
little contribution to the argument. This is a chronic risk of the New Historicist
method, which often draws connections among disparate events that are more
aesthetic than causal. The author uses such connections to explore unresolved
antinomies in liberal legal thought that he believes transcend time and place; but
historically trained readers may wonder how much thought-even very abstract,
formalist thought-ever transcends time and place.
Guyora Binder
SUNY-Buffalo

